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Argentina is still reeling from the ripple effects of the currency crisis that exploded in Mexico
early this year. Much of the capital that had fled Argentina as a result of the Mexican debacle has
returned to the country, and the Argentine stock market has bounced back nearly to the level it
had registered in December 1994, before the financial crisis began. Nevertheless, the economy has
fallen into recession as a result of severe liquidity problems in the national banking system, and
the GDP is not expected to rebound significantly until well into 1996. The economic slowdown has,
in turn, pushed unemployment to an unprecedented 18.6% of the economically active population,
generating massive protests by labor groups and grassroots organizations around the country.
The Mexican crisis had a powerful impact on most of the large South American economies during
the first semester of 1995, since confidence among foreign investors in Latin America was severely
shaken, leading to massive capital flight from the region. At the height of the crisis in March, the
largest stock markets in South America plunged by double digits, ranging from a 25% accumulated
drop in Chile to a 60% decline in Brazil (see NotiSur, 01/12/95, 02/02/95, 03/16/95, and 05/25/95).
Argentina was particularly hard hit by the ripple effect of the Mexican crisis, since most investors
feared that the country suffered from the same underlying financial imbalances that had led to
Mexico's currency devaluation in December, and thus they believed that a similar currency crisis
was imminent in Argentina.
In Mexico, the government had artificially maintained currency stability in 1994 by drawing on
short-term "soft loans" from foreign investors in stocks and bonds, which were used to finance a
monumental current-account deficit of US$28 billion. When investors started withdrawing their
capital in a mad rush in December 1994, the government's foreign reserves plummeted, forcing the
exchange rate to plunge and raising widespread fear that the financial crunch would force Mexico to
default on its foreign debt. In Argentina, many of the same imbalances were indeed present when
the Mexican crisis exploded. Since 1991, when President Carlos Menem's government launched its
economic stabilization plan dubbed the "convertibility plan" Argentine currency has remained on a
parity with the US dollar. To maintain the parity, the government is required by law to match at all
times the total number of pesos in circulation with an equal amount of foreign reserves, which are
held in the Central Bank.
At the same time, until the second half of 1994, the government exercised strict fiscal and monetary
discipline to balance public finances and control inflation, thereby alleviating pressures to devalue
local currency. Nevertheless, two factors generated concern that the peso had become markedly
overvalued by late 1994. First, the country registered a record trade deficit in 1994 of US$6 billion,
compared with a US$4 billion trade surplus in 1991, the year the convertibility plan began. The
deficit led independent economists to criticize the government for artificially maintaining the peso
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on a parity with the US dollar, since it greatly increased domestic demand for imported goods while
slighting the export sector. In fact, like Mexico, the government relied on soft loans from foreign
investors to finance the country's growing current-account deficit, suggesting that Argentina was
living well beyond its means. Second, in mid-1994 the government became much more lax in its
fiscal and monetary policies, in part because the May 1995 general elections were approaching and
the Menem administration appeared reluctant to force budget austerity during the campaign period.
As a result, a huge US$1.5 billion fiscal deficit appeared in the second semester of 1994, the first such
deficit since the convertibility plan began.
In addition, monetary authorities estimated that the deficit would grow to between US$2 billion
and US$3 billion in 1995 if the government did not take radical measures to balance the budget.
The appearance of a deficit, in turn, began to reignite inflation in early 1995, thus generating
more pressure on the government to devalue the peso, since the government commitment to a
fixed exchange rate had not allowed for any adjustment to compensate for accumulated inflation
since 1991. Through the convertibility plan, the Menem administration has managed to end the
hyperinflation that plagued the country prior to 1991, reducing annual inflation to just 3.6% in 1994.
But in early 1995, consumer prices began to climb again, and independent economists warned that
annual inflation for this year would edge above 5% if the government did not take measures to
eliminate the fiscal deficit. Against this backdrop, investors began massively withdrawing their
capital from Argentina shortly after the Mexican currency crisis exploded. At the height of the crisis
in mid-March, the Merval index for the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange plummeted by about 50% in
value compared with mid- December 1994, reaching its lowest level since the convertibility plan was
launched in 1991.
At the same time, the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves in the Central Bank declined
from about US$17 billion to about US$11 billion between December 1994 and early April 1995.
And, perhaps most disturbing, a frantic run on the banks drained about US$8.5 billion from the
national banking system, reducing total liquidity in the banks from US$46 billion to US$37.5 billion,
a whopping 18% drop. As a result, since the beginning of the year, 40 banks have been forced to
either close down or merge with larger banks, reducing the number of financial institutions in the
country from 205 to 165.
By late March, the plunge in the country's foreign reserves had pushed Argentina to the brink of
default on the public debt, since nearly US$9 billion in principal and interest was scheduled to come
due this year. In addition, Argentina is scheduled to pay another US$9.4 billion in debt maturities
in 1996, and more than US$11 billion annually from 1997 to 1999. The Menem administration,
however, refused to even consider renegotiating the foreign debt, and officials took painstaking
efforts to reassure investors that the government would uphold the convertibility plan to maintain
financial stability, thus discarding any possibility of currency devaluation. "We will not devalue
Argentine currency, and the suggestion that we should renegotiate the foreign debt is simply
unthinkable," said Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo, who is the architect of the convertibility
plan. "If Argentina stops paying its debt for even one year the loss of prestige would be so great that
every vestige of foreign and domestic credit would completely dry up."
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More austerity paves the way for IMF bailout
Rather than roll back the convertibility plan, the Menem administration drew up an emergency
austerity program in March that aims to invert the fiscal deficit into a surplus by year- end 1995. By
wiping out the deficit, the government hopes to cut the bottom out of inflation and thus alleviate
pressures to devalue local currency. The government expects this, in turn, will renew investor
confidence in the economy, while paving the way for fresh international credit to shore up the
country's reserves and ensure timely payments on the foreign debt.
The emergency program is generally broken into two parts: an overhaul of government finances
to balance the budget, and a new round of negotiations with multilateral lending institutions and
private creditors to secure a multibillion- dollar package of assistance for Argentina. Regarding
the fiscal reforms, the government implemented a series of cuts in federal spending, authorized an
increase in a number of key taxes, and accelerated efforts to privatize state firms. Taken together, the
government estimates that these measures will convert the deficit this year into a surplus of US$4.4
billion.
Among the specific measures included in the spending cuts and tax reforms are: * an increase in the
value-added tax (impuesto al valor agregado, IVA) by three percentage points from 18% to 21% for
a period of one year, which is expected to raise an additional US$2.250 billion for the government;
* a one-year increase in payroll taxes that should generate US$415 million in extra income by yearend; * temporary elimination of business rebates on export and import taxes, which should pull in
another US$885 million in revenue; * cuts in pay for high-income civil servants on a sliding scale of
up to 15%; and, * a temporary withholding of federal funds earmarked for the country's 23 provinces
and in some cases a reduction of the amount transferred to force local governments to carry out
austerity at the provincial level.
The effort to force provincial reform is considered a key element in the long-term struggle to
maintain a balanced federal budget, since the provinces continue to represent a major drain on
central government resources. Indeed, in recent years, some provinces have become excessively
dependent upon federal revenue-sharing funds, which runs counter to the goal of fostering better
managed, self-sufficient provincial governments. On average, federal revenue sharing accounts
for about 50% of total provincial financing. Some provinces are much more dependent, especially
the poor provinces in the northern region of Argentina. Per capita federal spending in the poor
provinces is about double that in the richer provinces.
Apart from the spending cuts and tax reforms, the government also expects to raise a total of US
$2.4 billion this year from the privatization of government firms and the sale of more state shares
in businesses that were already partially privatized. About US$1 billion will come from the sale of
petrochemical, nuclear, and hydroelectric plants, which include the Atucha II nuclear facilities and
the huge Yacyreta and Salto Grande hydroelectric projects. The remaining US$1.4 billion will come
from the sale of more shares in the former state gas and electric companies, and the sale of smaller
government assets, including shares in some 60 airports now run by the government, as well as the
federal postal service.
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The fiscal reform and austerity measures paved the way for successful negotiation of more foreign
aid in April, when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorsed the government's emergency
program. As a result of the IMF endorsement, the Menem administration received pledges from
various organizations for a total of US$6.7 billion in fresh loans for the country. The loan package
included US$2.4 billion from the IMF, US$1.3 billion from the World Bank, US$1 billion from the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and US$2 billion to be raised from government bonds
sold to domestic investors and foreign commercial banks.
All told, the government austerity program and the promise of fresh economic aid gave the Menem
administration US$11.1 billion in extra funds for this year: US$4.4 billion from the budget surplus
and US$6.7 billion in loans. Under the Menem administration's emergency program, the excess
funds were primarily to be used as a guarantee that the government would not default on its debtservicing obligations this year, thus renewing confidence among foreign investors to bring their
capital back to the country. A substantial portion of the funds were also earmarked to shore up
and restructure the national banking system, given the severe liquidity crisis in the aftermath of
the Mexican financial debacle. The government established two bank trust funds, one to finance
provincial bank privatizations and one to provide loans for commercial banks to reinforce liquidity.
Overall, the program is aimed at providing the credit needed to reorganize the financial system into
a more concentrated and efficient banking system. The government wants to avoid a return to the
proliferation of small, weak banks, which were rapidly forced to close down when large numbers
of depositors started withdrawing their savings in the first quarter of the year. Also, to alleviate the
liquidity problems, the Argentine Congress amended the Central bank charter in April to allow for
a limited private system of bank deposit guarantees. Under the amendment, which took effect on
April 18, sight deposits, savings accounts, and time deposits of up to US$10,000 are covered by the
guarantee. Coverage is increased to US$20,000 for time deposits of more than 90 days.
The amendments enable the Central Bank to serve as a "lender of last resort" to the banking system
while respecting the limits established by the 1991 convertibility law. (In effect, the Central Bank will
not lend more than 20% of reserves.) The emergency austerity program and the IMF-led financial
bailout restored confidence among many foreign investors, who have steadily begun to bring their
capital back to the country. As of early August, foreign reserves in the Central Bank had grown to
US$15.1 billion, up from the low in March of US$11 billion but still about US$2 billion below the
level of reserves registered before the Mexican financial crisis began.
The Merval index for the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange has experienced an erratic but fairly constant
recovery since March. The stock market capitalization index is now only 4.5% lower than at year-end
1994, compared with the 50% accumulated drop that had been registered in the first quarter of 1995.
And, Argentine banks have recovered about US$4.1 billion in deposits since May, with total liquidity
growing from the US$37.5 billion it had dropped to in March to about US$41 billion by late August,
meaning that the banks have recovered nearly half of the US$8.5 billion that was withdrawn from
the system at the height of the crisis.
Central Bank authorities estimate that by year-end, total deposits will climb back to the pre-crisis
level of US$46 billion. Economy slips into recession Nevertheless, notwithstanding the slow return
of capital to the country and the steady progress achieved in restoring financial stability, Argentina
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is now in the grip of recession, marking an abrupt shift from the high levels of growth recorded since
the convertibility plan began. In 1994, the economy expanded by a robust 6% the third-highest level
of growth in Latin America and the Caribbean bringing accumulated growth for the past five years
to nearly 33%. At year-end 1994, the government had estimated that the economy would expand
by another 5% to 6% in 1995. But in the first quarter of the year, the GDP only increased by 2.6%,
marking a dramatic drop compared with the first quarter of 1994, when the GDP grew by 9.7%.
Although official statistics for the second quarter are not yet available, preliminary reports on
industrial output during the April-June period indicate a sharp decline in production compared
with the same period in 1994. According to the prestigious Foundation for Latin American Economic
Studies (FIEL), Argentina's industrial production index (IPI) registered a 4.1% decline in the second
quarter of 1995 compared with the same period in 1994, bringing the accumulated drop in industrial
output during the first semester of the year to 0.5%.
In the month of June alone, the IPI fell by 5.2% compared with the same month in 1994. As a result,
even the government estimates that during the second quarter of the year, the GDP remained
stagnant with zero-level growth, at best. But, in sharp contrast to independent predictions, the
Menem administration insists that in the third and fourth quarters, growth will pick up again,
bringing total output for the year to about 3%. "There is no recession, because the economy will
grow by about 3% this year, notwithstanding the poor performance in the second quarter," said
Economy Minister Cavallo. "It is probable that there was zero-level growth in the April-June period,
but in the first quarter of the year the GDP expanded by 2.6%, and we expect a similar level of
growth in the third quarter and even greater output in the fourth quarter. By next year, the economy
will be back on track with a 5% growth rate."
Nevertheless, nearly all independent economists say the government's estimates are extremely
optimistic. In early July, for example, the US Embassy predicted that, based on a rough sample
of production indexes during the first semester, the economy has only a 25% chance of achieving
growth above 2% in 1995. According to the report, there is a 50% chance of between 0% and 2%
growth, and a 25% chance of negative growth. The main problem is the severe liquidity crisis in the
national banking system, since loans for consumers and the productive sector virtually dried up
during the first semester of 1995. That, in turn, greatly depressed consumer demand on the domestic
market, while pushing many small and medium-sized businesses into a financial crunch.
According to some private-sector studies, consumption fell by 5% in the two-month period from
March-April, at the height of the banking-sector crisis. The US Embassy estimates that by the end
of 1995, total consumption will have fallen by 3% for the year. The government as well reports that
consumption of beer, wine, and soft drinks fell by 4.9%, 10.2%, and 7.2%, respectively, during the
first quarter of the year compared with the same period in 1994, and domestic car sales dropped
by 30%. At the same time, a new study released in July by the prestigious private consulting firm
Quiebras y Concursos shows a record number of business bankruptcies during the first semester of
1995.
According to the report, in the January- June period the number of businesses that declared
bankruptcy increased by 26% compared with the same period in 1994. Quiebras y Concursos says
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that in June alone the number of bankruptcy petitions filed in the courts by local businesses was
93% higher than the same month in 1994. More than 8,000 businesses have now been forced to
shut down their operations since the convertibility plan was launched in 1991, and the figure will
likely grow to more than 10,000 by year-end 1995. The government argues that, notwithstanding the
drop in domestic demand, growth will continue this year and in 1996 because local industries have
reoriented their sales toward the external market, making up for the drop in domestic sales through
an increase in exports. Indeed, during the first semester of the year, the trade deficit inverted to a
surplus for the first time since the country's trade balance slipped into the red in 1991 (see NotiSur,
09/14/95).
The government also emphasizes that the fiscal austerity imposed since March has allowed the
government to successfully reverse the inflationary spiral that had begun in the beginning of the
year. According to the official statistics agency (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, INDEC),
in May the consumer price index (CPI) registered 0% inflation, and in June the CPI dropped by
0.2%, given that prices for such basic goods as food products declined by 0.7%, clothing by 0.5%, and
leisure services by 0.3%. Accumulated inflation for the first six months of the year was only 1.1%,
encouraging optimistic official predictions of below 3% annual inflation by year-end 1995.
Still, even if the drop in consumer inflation and the reversal of the trade deficit are both positive
developments, they are both stark reflections of the economic recession that now grips Argentina,
since it is precisely the plunge in domestic demand that has fomented exports, reduced imports, and
lowered prices. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the drop in consumer prices, INDEC reports noticeable
increases in the wholesale price index (WPI) during the first half of the year. In May, for example,
the WPI increased by 0.3% even though the CPI remained stable at 0%, and during the 12-month
period ending in May, the WPI increased by 9.6%, compared with only a 4.3% increase in the CPI.

Record unemployment provokes violent social conflicts
Moreover, the recession has led to an alarming increase in unemployment since the beginning
of the year. According to the latest official survey of Argentine households, carried out by the
Planning Ministry in May and published in mid-July, a total of 2.2 million workers are unemployed,
affecting 18.6% of Argentina's 11.8 million economically active population (EAP). The Planning
Ministry conducts its survey two times per year. In the last report, released in October 1994, open
unemployment affected 12.2% of the EAP, meaning that the number of people without work grew by
52% between October 1994 and May 1995.
Unemployment is now three times higher than when the Menem administration launched its
convertibility plan in 1991, when the unemployment rate stood at 6.9%. In fact, Argentina now
has the second-highest unemployment rate in Latin America after Nicaragua, and it has a higher
rate than all the industrialized countries, with the exception of Spain. In comparison, the average
unemployment rate of countries in the European Union is 12%. In addition, another 1.4 million
Argentine workers, or 11.8% of the EAP, are underemployed. As a result, a total of 3.6 million
workers or 31% of the total work force are now either without work, or are only able to find parttime jobs. The alarming growth in unemployment is a direct result of the government's economic
policies.
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The privatization of hundreds of former state businesses has thrown tens of thousands of civil
servants out of work. At the same time, the government's efforts to open the domestic market to
foreign competition has forced industrial, commercial, and agricultural firms to severely downsize
their work forces and replace employees with modern technology to compete adequately with
foreign investors. Many other businesses have simply been forced to shut down. The Menem
administration, however, insists that the unemployment situation is only a temporary problem, and
in fact a necessary side effect of the effort to modernize the economy.
"The increase is unemployment was inevitable," said President Menem in mid-September. "We
are completely committed to carrying out the reforms necessary to forge a new economic model
in Argentina, and the changes unfortunately have some inconveniences and problems. One of
those problems is the unemployment situation, which we are trying to overcome, but there is
no alternative for Argentina other than to push forward with the economic transformation now
underway." Added Economy Minister Cavallo, "We believe the worst is over. From here forward
the situation will get better." Not surprisingly, however, Argentina's huge pool of unemployed
workers has grown desperate in recent months, leading to frequent, massive rioting in most of the
country's poor provinces. Since April, violent strikes and protest demonstrations have exploded
almost constantly in the provinces of Tierra del Fuego, Cordova, San Juan, Jujuy, Salta, Entre Rios,
and Santiago de Estero (see NotiSur, 04/21/95, 07/14/95, and 09/08/95). In fact, new riots broke out in
the southern province of Rio Negro on Sept. 22, where thousands of public employees are on strike
to protest government delays in paying salaries, as well as a plan by the provincial government to
reduce the level of pay for civil servants to balance the province's finances.
The largest protests erupted in the city of Viedma, the provincial capital about 1,000 km south of
Buenos Aires. Smaller riots also took place in most other cities in that province. To calm tensions, in
early August the government announced a series of measures to alleviate unemployment problems.
Among other things, the Menem administration promised to expand unemployment benefits from
the 110,000 workers presently covered to about 400,000, and to increase the amount paid to those
eligible to receive benefits. The government also said it would immediately invest US$1.5 billion in
an emergency housing fund with the goal of constructing 100,000 homes for low-income families.
The program could create up to 300,000 temporary jobs, since officials estimate that for every house
built, at least three new jobs are created.
Nevertheless, the government will be hard pressed to meet its promises, since the Menem
administration is still strapped to its commitment to the IMF to maintain fiscal austerity. Indeed,
the government collected an estimated US$700 million less in taxes in the March-July period than it
expected to generate from the new taxes decreed under the emergency austerity program. The IMF
must still disburse US$1.2 billion of the US$2.4 billion it promised to the government in March, and
the Menem administration may be forced to decree new taxes and other belt-tightening measures to
meet its goals.
An IMF team for example, visited the country for three weeks in August to evaluate the success
of the March accord. Reportedly, the team suggested that, among other things, the government
could enact new taxes on gasoline sales to increase state revenue enough to meet the fiscal goals
outlined last March. Meanwhile, the country's labor unions are becoming more militant, and new
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strikes and protest actions are likely to explode in the coming months. On Sept. 6, the country's
only labor confederation (Confederacion General del Trabajo, CGT) held a 24-hour general strike to
demonstrate its opposition to the lack of effective government programs to lower the unemployment
rate.
The CGT is a pro-government organization that has generally either supported the Menem
administration's policies or preferred to negotiate with officials rather than carry out protest
actions. The CGT was joined on Sept. 6 by two other labor groups Movimiento de los Trabajadores
Argentinos (MTA) and Congreso de los Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA) both of which are splinter
groups that broke off from the CGT in 1992 because the CGT refused to take a more militant stance
against the Menem administration's economic policies (see NotiSur, 11/19/92). "I don't have a
problem with this government, but until now it has not taken any serious measures to address
social problems and generate new jobs," said CGT Secretary General Gerardo Martinez in his
address to a workers' demonstration in Buenos Aires the day of the strike."We cannot accept a dual
society that excludes half the Argentine population. We want an integrated society and a state that
acts fairly for all sectors, not just for businesspeople and bankers. There have to be changes in the
economic program, because workers are not going to accept savage capitalism. Democracy and
stability are not attainable if there is no social policy that assures the welfare of workers." [Sources:
Journal of Commerce, 04/28/95, 07/10/95; Wall Street Journal, 03/31/95, 07/26/95; United Press
International, 04/21/95, 04/22/95, 04/28/95, 05/01/95, 07/18/95, 07/19/95, 07/24/95, 08/04/95, 08/11/95;
Notimex, 04/20/95, 05/24/95, 07/20/95, 07/21/95, 07/24/95, 08/10/95, 08/11/95, 08/14/95; Associated
Press, 03/ 14/95, 06/08/95, 07/10/95, 08/02/95, 08/11/95, 08/23/95, 08/25/95; Argentina Economic News,
US-Embassy International Market Insights (Buenos Aires), 03/30/95, 04/28/95, 05/22/95, 06/16/95,
06/29/95, 07/27/95, 07/31/95, 08/02/95, 08/03/95, 08/16/95, 09/01/95; Financial Times, 04/13/95,
06/27/95, 09/01/95, 09/06/95; Inter Press Service, 05/04/95, 05/17/95, 08/09/95, 09/06/95; Reuter,
03/13/95, 04/06/95, 04/12/95, 05/27/95, 05/29/95, 07/06-08/95, 07/15/95, 07/18-21/95, 07/24- 27/95,
08/07/95, 08/08/95, 08/13/95, 08/16/95, 08/16/95, 09/04/95, 09/06/95, 09/08/95; Agence France-Presse,
03/13- 16/95, 03/21/95, 03/28/95, 04/07/95, 04/12/95, 04/13/95, 05/04/95, 05/10/95, 05/11/95, 05/16/95,
05/22-25/95, 05/28/95, 05/29/95, 05/31/95, 06/01/95, 06/05-08/95, 06/12-16/95, 06/20- -22/95, 06/24/95,
06/25/95, 06/28/95, 06/29/95, 07/01-06/95, 07/10/95, 07/11/95, 07/13/95, 07/15/95, 07/17/95, 07/19/95,
07/20/95, 07/24-31/95, 08/01/95, 08/05-08/95, 08/10-12/95, 08/14-17/95, 08/22/95, 08/24/95, 08/28/95,
08/30/95, 08/31/95, 09/02/95, 09/05-07/95, 09/11-15/95, 09/18/95, 09/19/95, 09/23/95; New York Times,
03/02/95, 04/15/95, 05/04/95, 06/17/95, 07/13/95, 09/25/95]

-- End --
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